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Design science consists of two major design processes: building and evaluation. A well-
executed evaluation of design artifacts is crucial to their success. Traditional evaluation tools 
have certain weaknesses because design artifacts include “wicked” problems. Serious Gaming 
can help to overcome these problems. To this end an online based cloud resource managing 
game is developed which simulates the implementation of a market mechanism and represents 
a new design artifact. This mechanism is a heuristic solution consisting of dynamic pricing and 
a priority policy. The aim of this research is to show that Serious Gaming complements 
traditional evaluation tools and improves the evaluation of market mechanisms. Therefore, a 
general guideline for designing Serious Games for evaluation is developed and a classification 
of Serious Gaming is established. After having collected sufficient data, future work will be to 
analyze players’ behavior and finally evaluate the market mechanism. 
Keywords: Serious Gaming, Design Science, Market Engineering, Evaluation Methods 
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Introduction 
In the early 1890s, the Belgian chemist Leo Baekeland invented an improved photographic paper which did not 
need sunlight for developing pictures. A few years later Baekeland sold his patent rights to the Eastman Kodak 
Company for $1 million (Amato 1999). Initially, Baekeland planned to sell the rights for a sum somewhere 
between $25,000 and $50,000. Since Eastman bided before Baekeland could reveal his asking price, Baekeland 
brought off a big deal. This shows us that market design can really change the outcome of a market (Weinhardt 
et al. 2003). Economic science tries to give an insight into how markets work, Karl Marx however said: “The 
philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways - the point however is to change it” (Marx 1845). 
This proposes a different view of economics: economics as a design science (Varian 2002). The design science 
consists of two major design processes: building and evaluation (March and Smith 1995). The latter is very 
important for the success of designs (Hevner et al. 2004). This paper focuses on the evaluation aspect in terms of 
searching for alternative evaluation tools for design artifacts. 
Hevner et al. (2004) define artifacts as constructs, models, methods and instantiations applied in the development 
and usage of information systems. 
 
“Artifacts are innovations that define the ideas, practices, technical capabilities, and products through which the 
analysis, design, implementation, and use of information systems can be effectively and efficiently 
accomplished.” (Hevner et al. 2004) 
The examined design artifact is a policy-based heurist for resource allocation in cloud computing. In the case 
study, this market mechanism is going to be evaluated by comparing the results of the mechanism with the 
outcome of human test subjects in a game which depicts managers’ allocation decisions.  
Design implementation is a “wicked” problem since it is a situation in which one cannot gain experience from 
this situation because of the situation’s uniqueness. Furthermore, the implementer is threatened by consequences 
which cannot be revoked. Like an architect constructing a bridge, a market designer has a single attempt for the 
implementation of just one blue print. If the architect fails, the bridge will collapse, just like a provider will not 
earn the best possible revenue if the allocation mechanism is not appropriate (Rittel and Webber 1973). Hence a 
pathway is required in which an artifact can be tested without risking real consequences. The outcome of market 
engineering is determined by agent behavior and the market structure (Weinhardt et al. 2003). A better market 
outcome can be anticipated by utilization of improved evaluation tools. Usually market designers use 
simulations, pilot runs, analytical approaches or laboratory experiments for analyzing agents’ behavior and 
design evaluation before implementing mechanisms (Neumann 2004). However, these conventional evaluation 
tools have several weaknesses which will be discussed in section “Traditional Evaluation Techniques”. The 
paper proposes that research has to take a step from simulated behavior in simulations to real behavior in a 
simulated environment. This environment can be implemented within a serious game. This approach can be 
favorable since the agents’ behavior is real and not distorted by assumptions about their behavior. Assumptions 
about the market environment are needed for a serious game and they are needed for a simulation as well. Using 
games as a simulation is not a new idea. Military officers have been using war games in order to train strategic 
skills for a long time. One of the oldest games is the Indian board game called Chaturanga or Wei hei, which was 
played approximately 2.000 BC (Susi et al. 2007). Another example for early serious gaming is an early 19th 
century Prussian military training game called “Kriegsspiel” (German for wargame), which included multiplayer 
playing (up to 10 people), communication and information sets (von Hilgers 2000). Even in the gulf war in 1990 
the Pentagon used war board games to figure out strategies.  
Serious Gaming (SG) as an evaluation tool is a relatively unexplored scope in economic research. We want to 
show that serious games (SGs) are an efficient way of evaluating artifacts.  
Following this brief introduction, we are going to discuss the main evaluation tools and SG as such a tool. 
Finally we are going to introduce the game setup for the case study and show our outline for the further progress 
of our research. 
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What is a Serious Game? 
The term “Serious Games” (SGs) is an oxymoron, a composition of two contradictory terms. Games are usually 
not associated with a productive way of spending time. However, SGs want to combine a higher purpose with an 
entertaining environment (Michael and Chen 2006; Zyda 2005). This concept is already used in education and 
training games (in schools, companies or the military), advergames (advertisement embedded in games), health 
games (e.g. a driving simulation for people with driving phobias) or games as work (like professional online 
casino player) (Dahl et al. 2009; Stapleton 2004). SGs are a small but rising fraction on the $10 billion video 
game market of the US, representing a $20 million industry in the US (approx. $70 million worldwide) (Sawyer 
2007; Susi et al. 2007; van Eck 2006).  
For this research paper the following definition is used, based upon Zyda (2005):  
A Serious Game is a mental contest which is played in accordance with specific rules to observe a certain result 
or behavior of the players. 
Traditional Evaluation Techniques  
Analytic Approaches 
Theoretical models or game theoretical approaches are an abstract way of evaluating artifacts. The center of 
theoretical models is a formal representation which is associated with very restrictive assumptions and constrains 
the analysis. The divergence between model environment and real world has to be considered. Therefore, 
theoretical models as stand-alone indicators are not sufficient for the evaluation process. Aggregate theoretical 
views are mostly dominated by agent-based techniques. Theoretical models’ strength is the ability to give an 
economical intuition of the problem and to separate between important and unimportant factors (Neumann 2004; 
Schieritz and Milling 2007). Game theory studies the behavior of rational agents who react to the behavior of 
other agents. It is an easy tool to analyze ordinary problems. The evaluator has to handle multiple decision 
factors, inconsistent behavior, interference of an outside party, time-lags, uncertainties and conflicting goals 
(Babb et al. 1966; Korhonen et al. 1986). Numerical computation takes too much time caused by big strategy 
spaces.  Although computation takes long, it does not yield a feasible solution every time (Neumann 2004). 
Game theory will not deliver exact solutions but the results can be seen as useful approximations. The outcomes 
might be weaker than expected (Milgrom 2004). 
SG introduces real agents to the evaluation. While analytic approaches try to incorporate every factor of the 
issue, real agents act heuristic and pragmatic. Adopting artifacts, which are only examined by analytical 
approaches, can lead to unexpected outcomes because people act rather reasonable than rational (Rawls 1993). 
Simulations 
Simulations are defined as “the imitation of the operation of a real world process or system over time” (Banks 
1998). Simulations can provide a significant and controllable environment which can deliver an answer to 
various scenarios.  Besides, simulations can predict behavior in easy problem sets surprisingly well. Also, they 
can help managers developing a better understanding of processes and operations (Banks 1998). 
Nevertheless, there are also a few disadvantages: Simulations need a lot of resources for calculation and a big 
input of time and knowledge is required. Moreover simulation technology costs are relatively high including 
hardware, integration, software licenses, maintenance of technology and training costs (McLean and Leong 
2001). These restrictions often lead to a fragmentarily conducted analysis. Due to restricted time and knowledge, 
professionals need heuristic solutions (Law 1983). Furthermore, the evaluation of a market mechanism is a 
“wicked” problem. A “wicked“ problem has certain characteristics: it lacks definitive formulation, stopping rule 
and ultimate test. Simulations cannot handle these features properly (Rittel and Webber 1973). They also bear 
some methodical weak points like using just a given set of input parameter or severe theoretical assumptions in 
model building (Schnizler 2007). Furthermore, simulations can suffer from an absence of useful benchmarks.  
SG can serve as a benchmark and represent pragmatic human intelligence. Hence SG can complement traditional 
simulations. SGs are associated with high technology and human resource costs as well. But in contrast, games 
need no knowledge about behavior or the dimension of the issue because this will be explored by the players. 
Strategies which are not mentioned by the professionals can be found as SG utilizes collective intelligence. An 
example that SGs can outperform simulations: At the very beginning of the gulf war, the Pentagon wanted to 
figure out an optimal response strategy. Unfortunately, simulations could not answer this question sufficiently. 
The Pentagon decided to make use of the commercial war board game “Gulf Strike” to simulate and negotiate 
most of the later real strategies (Dunnigan 1992; von Hilgers 2000).  
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Field Studies and Laboratory Experiments 
Field studies and test runs implement artifacts in a separated sphere e.g. a specific regional market. Laboratory 
experiments implement these artifacts in a test environment under well-defined conditions.  Field studies have 
the advantage that they are conducted in a real environment. However, they are expensive, can cause negative 
consequence, like losing customers in the test market and cannot evaluate a variety of alternatives. Moreover, it 
is difficult to control all experiment factors in the field and reproducibility is not guaranteed.  
Laboratory experiments are much cheaper than field studies and do not contain real risks. Furthermore, they can 
examine different artifacts alternatives very easily. However experimentalists need a sophisticated setup of 
experiment and incentives for subjects, otherwise experiments can draw wrong conclusions (Muller 1999).  
SGs have a key incentive for participating: entertainment for the participants. Subjects are not as aware of being 
observed as if they would be invited to attend a test in a laboratory. They do not feel forced to answer in a 
manner which the investigator wants to hear (observer-expectancy effect). An investigator is not required for 
SGs and a great number of test persons can be acquired. Laboratory experiments are often biased through having 
almost exclusively students as test persons. SG can be open to everybody but it can be excludable as well. 
Professionals are usually hard to obtain for an experiment, however SG is easy to use and neither location nor 
time bound. So it can facilitate obtaining professionals. A further disadvantage of laboratory experiments is the 
Hawthorne effect1. Test persons in SGs do not have to be aware of taking part in a study as long as they are 
made belief that it is an ordinary game. The research purpose can stay undisclosed. This can prevent hypothesis 
guessing as well.  
Summarizing, SG can improve the projection of real world using real agents. A combination of SGs, 
experiments and simulations is conceivable and beneficial for evaluation. 
Serious Gaming as an Evaluation Tool 
Evaluation Market Mechanisms with Serious Gaming 
Classification of the Method 
In accordance with Hevner et al. (2004), the classification of SG as an evaluation method takes place within two 
dimensions: formalization level and paradigm. Formalization represents the distinction between qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Paradigm is divided into behavioral and constructive approaches. Behavioral methods are 
focused on impacts on companies, people and markets. Constructive methods are mainly interested in the 
development of artifacts.  
For classification of SG see figure 1 which depicts paradigm on abscissa, formalization on ordinate2 and 
frequency of usage in the area of the circles. Frequency was adopted with data by Palvia et al. (2004) who 
conducted an empirical analysis of research methods in famous information systems research journals3 between 
1998 and 2003. SG is classified as a behavioral quantitative method (denoted by the gamepad in figure 1). This 
results from the fact that SG has a formalization level equal to reference models and a similar paradigm like 
laboratory experiments. Reference models try to simplify circumstances formally and represent business 
situations understandably. They are deducted inductively or deductively from empiricism or theoretic models 
and try to develop optimal concepts for information systems (Wilde and Hess 2007). Since game developers 
have to model the business’ environment, SG uses simplified concepts. Therefore, SG takes place in a 
quantitative environment. 
Because it tests artifacts under conditions comparable to real implementation, SG is very close to the idea of 
laboratory experiments. The methods attempt to find conclusions from test persons’ behavior through 
observation. Therefore, SG is a behavioral approach with constructive influence through the simulated 
implementation. SG is not congruent with laboratory experiments as mentioned in the section “Traditional 
Evaluation Techniques”. 
                                                           
1 As test persons feel privileged to be a part of an experiment, they tend to change their behavior. 
2 Characteristic of dimensions are taken from Wilde and Hess (2007), except method of SG. 
3 Communications of the ACM, Decision Sciences, Information and Management, Information Systems Research, Journal of 
Management Information Systems, MIS Quarterly and Management Science. 
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Figure 1.  Classification of methods in terms of formalization and paradigms 
At first glance, there might be inconsistencies by proposing a behavioral method as a design evaluation tool for 
constructive design science. But this criticism can be neglected: Behavioral science’s purpose is to find 
explanations of phenomena, to find the truth, whereas design science’s objective is to find solutions for problems 
and yield utility. Both are inseparable. A certain quantum of theory is needed for design whereas construction 
can result in a new chapter of unexplored theory (Hevner et al. 2004). An architect cannot construct a bridge 
without knowledge of statics, materials or physics. Analogously, an economist has to know about customers’ 
preference, technology acceptance and behavior when designing a market mechanism. Referring to Karl Marx’ 
quote from the beginning, philosophers must interpret the world in order to change it4.  
Evaluation Design 
The evaluation is a critical part of the design process. We have to create a business environment for the 
evaluation which is a new design artifact in its own right. The purpose of the evaluation is to reveal the 
mechanism’s quality, efficacy, efficiency, adaptability and utility. To accomplish this purpose, the evaluation has 
to be executed carefully and rigorously. If the prior defined requirements are satisfied, the evaluation either 
results in suggestions for improving the mechanism or authorizes the actual implementation. Considering that 
design is a “wicked” problem, evaluated criteria must be defined due to relevance and rigor (Hevner et al. 2004; 
Rittel and Webber 1973). 
A brief guideline for a SG evaluation is given in figure 2 orientating itself to George Pólya’s sequence of 
heuristic solutions (Pólya 1945). 
 
 
Figure 2. Sequence of a Serious Gaming evaluation 
 
                                                           
4 Maybe that is why his state ideology failed in the “field trial”. 
 Lang et al. / Serious Gaming for the Evaluation of Market Mechanisms 
  
 Thirtieth International Conference on Information Systems, Phoenix 2009 6 
(1) problem definition 
As mentioned above, the problem and the purpose have to be defined at first. This information is important for 
step 2. Based upon the problem definition, the Serious Game has to be constructed. 
(2) game conception 
The game conception features two main factors: game design and rule design. Game design represents our 
economic environment, whereas rule design is important for interaction between players or the game’s sequence. 
For instance, the rules of the MIT “beer distribution game” prohibit communication between value chain groups. 
This changes the outcome of the game significantly (Sterman 1989). Test runs are important to find out if the 
game can satisfy the requirements and user-friendliness. Test runs are also an evaluation method and are used for 
evaluation of the game which represents a new created artifact in its own right. The evaluation of the game is 
needed to prevent errors in the conception.  
(3) playing 
In step 3, the game is implemented and test persons can play the game. If expert knowledge is required, well-
informed players have to be found. Players should be given the opportunity to play test rounds and to play the 
game repeatedly. This can prevent playful manner and accustom the player to the game. Competition and award 
can also improve results because players participate more actively and ambitiously (Babb et al. 1966; Binmore 
2007). 
(4)  analysis 
In the analysis, the mechanism’s result is set in proportion to the players’ results. Comparing the results to a 
further benchmark can improve validity. Benchmarks can be an automatism or a computed theoretical solution, 
for example. Further observations of effective strategies and successful behavior should be used to improve the 
artifacts. Alternative game settings can be introduced in order to compare results on different suppositions. 
Additionally, the players can be confronted with shocks and crises. The reaction of the players and the 
mechanism in abnormal situations is interesting for further research projects. 
Case Study: Online Based Cloud Managing Game 
A Market Mechanism for Clouds 
The mechanism is a policy-based heuristic for resource management in cloud computing. It is taken from 
Püschel and Neumann (2009). A dynamic pricing policy is proposed which takes into account that capacities are 
limited. It adjusts ask prices as opportunity costs for reducing capacities. In this scenario, we assume that there is 
a client classification including “gold clients”, whose requests are given priority. The heuristic is formalized as 
follows: 
 
The objective function encodes information about the ascending order of requests and the capacity constraint 
implies that utilization must not exceed capacity limits in any period. Introducing different utilization stages, the 
ask price can be calculated as a step function of the utilization. Finally, the mechanism suggests a higher ask 
price for non-gold client requests, if utilization exceeds a certain percentage of the available capacity. The 
consequence of treating clients with different priorities is said to provide system stability and Quality of Service 
(QoS). 
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The Cloud Managing Game  
(1) problem definition 
The objective is a performance evaluation of the market mechanism. The problem set is given through the 
mechanism and the game structure. The performance of the players has to be compared with the mechanism. 
Furthermore, the behavior of players has to be analyzed. SG serves as a benchmark. Additional benchmarks are a 
policy which adopts “first-come, first-serve” and the theoretical optimum. Both benchmarks are not as suitable 
as SG since “first-come, first-serve” is a dull policy and the theoretical optimum is not feasible due to lacking 
information and uncertainty. 
(2) game conception 
The game is set in a cloud computing firm. The player as the economic agent (EA) has to manage resource 
allocation in order to maximize the revenue. The game is online based and is designed with HTML, php and 
JavaScript, including a MySQL database.5  
 
Figure 3. Screenshot of the game design 
The setup of the scenario contains three resource types r = {processing power, bandwidth, memory} with a fixed 
capacity of  and three products s = {calculation (0.16/0.04/0.08), backup (0.04/ 0.04/0.16), video hosting 
(0.04/0.16/0.08)}, where numbers in round brackets denote the usage of resource r by one unit of service s in 
percent of the capacity. One single request covers several instances and resource demand for one request is 
pretty high (up to 16%). These simplifications are needed to make the issue cognizable to the players. In real 
cloud computing several requests are submitted per second making human real time decision impossible. 
Slowing decision speed down does not affect validity of human decision. Ten job lists are created in advance. 
These jobs can start off either right after submission or in a future period. The runtime of the jobs varies. Job 
requests also contain information about the number of instances asked and the bid price for this job. The EA can 
cancel running tasks but has to pay a contractual penalty which depends on the full price. There are 25 imaginary 
customers; five of them are gold clients. In order to secure Quality of Service and system stability, overload 
situations are prohibited. If capacity would be exceeded otherwise, the EA has to cancel a running task or reject a 
request (Püschel et al. 2007).  If a gold client request is rejected, the player has to pay a penalty representing a 
lost benefit caused by the violation of the gold client priority. After a given amount of periods the game ends and 
all running tasks are paid out to keep efforts stable. 
(3) playing 
In order to get large data and an economic educated group, graduate economics students as well as doctoral 
students are chosen as players. Players can play the game repeatedly, so they can apply both playful and serious 
strategies. Besides being mentioned in a high score list, the best player can win a gift coupon if s/he has 
outperformed the market mechanism. This should be a sufficient incentive for participating and acting seriously. 
                                                           
5 The game is accessible under http://is-games.vwl.uni-freiburg.de/cloudmanager 
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(4) analysis 
A calculation of the theoretical optimum under perfect information and certainty is made. Each player’s and the 
mechanism’s performance is measured by dividing the revenue through the optimal revenue yielding a 
percentage ratio of the performance. The theoretical optimum is computed under the assumption of full 
information hence this solution is not feasible due to unavailable information about future jobs. A further 
benchmark is introduced realizing a “first-come, first-serve” policy. This policy lacks sophistication and 
therefore it is not very convincing. That is why SG is needed. The proficiency of the market mechanism is 
concluded out of the performance of the average player and the high score players. Afterwards, the mechanism is 
adjusted adopting strategies used by successful players. 
Preliminary Results 
After the first test rounds, it was exposed that the mechanism beats human players on average. Single players can 
outperform the mechanism, however not consistently. Interviewing the best players yielded that they used some 
kind of ask prices like the mechanism. If the player had an information advantage similar to the theoretical 
optimum (e.g. unpunished cancelations of running jobs), the best players would have achieved a performance 
close to the optimum proving that human being can handle such problems. Since there were no available 
mechanisms for comparison, SG appeared to be a good benchmark. 
Conclusion and Outlook 
Complex problems can be too complicated for laboratories. SGs can illustrate very vague coherences without 
confusing the player since the coherences are hidden in the game engine. While the contribution in a laboratory 
experiment is mandatory when test persons signed up for it, SGs have not any commitments since they can be 
played whenever the player chooses to. 
Organizational issues are crucial to the success of the development and the implementation of a design artifact 
(Hevner et al. 2004). Games incorporate the economic modeling of simulations, but also provide much more 
opportunities for the setting. For instance, lagging and lacking information can be included. Therefore, SGs have 
a high potential on studying organizational issues. Unlike game theoretical approaches, where people try to 
understand behavior by considering mostly rational agents and severe assumptions, SG can simulate the same 
situation without these hard limitations and with a more detailed reality. Game designers can vary 
communication opportunities, the quantity of decision variables, ways of interaction between players, time 
delays, crisis vs. non-crisis decisions and uncertainty very easily (Barone et al. 1975). Scientists do not need 
severe assumptions, but only a set of rules implemented in the game design. Babb et al. (1966) showed that 
played policies are congruent with real-life decisions; therefore we can measure behavior using a business 
simulation.  
Human beings have another way of accessing information than computers: They have restricted memory 
capacities and awareness and make use of heuristics. Furthermore, they cannot build expectations properly and 
are driven partially by emotions (von Nitzsch 2002). Consequently, SG uses heterogeneous agent models and is 
very beneficial for market interaction problems. 
If the market mechanism is evaluated as being weak due to the players’ superiority, the design of the mechanism 
can be improved by analyzing players’ manners. If the mechanism can outperform the players, this is no reason 
to stop improving the mechanism. Depending on the setting, people have limited capabilities to comprehend 
contexts and solve the setting’s problems. Nevertheless, they can represent a benchmark. This is valuable all the 
more if other benchmarks lack validity like in the case study.  
The preliminary results showed that SG is suitable for an evaluation. Furthermore, Hevner et al. (2004) stated 
that comparison of an evaluation method with alternative approaches is crucial for claims of generalization. SG 
is such an alternative approach. 
Concluding, the study is going to show if the suggested market mechanism performs well by using SG. SG is a 
promising research method which will be supported through further research. The on-going research is going to 
be a more detailed demonstration of the potential of SG. The market mechanism represents a heuristic solution to 
resource management and can improve provider’s revenue and customer’s QoS-level. Until now the scope of SG 
is not explored very well. We hope that research is going to come upon new findings. 
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